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I) Introduction 
 
The horrific bombings of the US embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam thrust 
east Africa to the centre of world concern over the threat of terrorism and 
presaged the events of September 11th and the declaration of the Global ‘War on 
Terror’. Images of crumbled office blocks and the twisted wreckage of buses and 
vehicles on the streets of central Nairobi gave rise to public consciousness of 
Osama Bin Laden and a new brand of international terrorism. Following the 
attacks, U.S. President Clinton ordered the targeted air strike of a pharmaceutical 
plant in Khartoum, the capital city of neighbouring Sudan, which remains on the 
US list of state sponsors of terror and for a time in the 1990s was official host to 
Bin Laden. Kenya has since been the theatre for further attacks targeting Israeli 
tourists and commercial interests. The conflagration of violence and renewed clan 
warfare that has gripped neighbouring Somalia since the invasion of US-backed 
Ethiopian forces in late 2006 against the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) that briefly 
governed southern Somalia has drawn Kenya deeper into the persecution of the 
‘War on Terror’. 
 
Kenya’s cooperation on counter-terrorism objectives in the ‘War on Terror’, in 
turn, has intersected with social divisions and debates in a shifting domestic 
political context, renewing concerns over the treatment of Muslims and Somalis 
and highlighting the fragility of civic space that was carved out during the 
democracy struggles of the 1990s. The background to these concerns and 
tensions was the historic election in 2002 of a coalition of opposition parties that 
was supported by a wide section of civil society including churches and religious 
leaders, human rights organisations and democracy and governance NGOs. The 
election marked the consolidation of democratic processes stretching back over a 
decade. Throughout this period aid levels continuously declined to the Kenyan 
government as increasing amounts of democracy assistance were channeled 
through a blossoming civil society organising around governance and human 
rights issues. The democratic triumphalism of 2002 marked the opening of 
political space and a shift in relations between the state and civil society. 
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Thus, the encapsulation of Kenya into the ‘Global War on Terror’ has coincided 
with democratic strides and a widening space for deliberative politics. There have 
been significant shifts in the terrain for organising outside of the state, as well. 
The role for civil society is no longer defined by gaining access to political 
processes and decision-making, which was marked by the election of a reformist 
government and the inclusion of several civil society leaders into elected positions 
and statutory bodies. However, the opening of political debate has been matched 
by the fragmentation of civil society around competing interest groups, reflecting 
deep divisions and centrifugal forces seen in wider society.  
 
The changing role of diplomacy and aid has been significant, as well, in shaping 
the contours of state-civil society relations in the context of counter-terrorism. The 
Kenyan government has instituted a new counter-terrorism regime under 
considerable diplomatic and aid pressure thus giving rise to new pressures and 
threats for civil society. In this context, the leverage of aid has shifted away from 
previous priorities on good governance and human rights. Civil society support 
has also declined due to the drive of aid donors to align with the government’s 
development priorities and goals and to this end work through government 
programmes and agencies. Elements of civil society have been an important part 
of internal forces that have opposed the introduction of new counter-terrorism 
structures and advocated for the protection of human rights and treatment of 
suspect communities. However, in spite of the opening of political space, the 
challenges of counter-terrorism have brought to light the lack of political 
consciousness in mainstream civil society, which on whole has failed to respond 
to emerging human rights concerns, the treatment of minorities and restrictions on 
the spaces for civil society to organise. 
 
This paper begins by examining the politics of aid, civil society and the state in a 
deeper historical context. The emergence of civil society as a broad terrain for 
organising tied into state-building processes that disadvantaged certain 
populations and regions of the country. Since 2001 the security prerogatives of 
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northern governments have come to increasingly shape aid donorship through the 
creation of institutional linkages between development departments and security 
agencies, the inclusion of new security objectives in development strategies, and 
the concomitant development of programming and new funding pools to support 
security-oriented work. In Kenya, the role of aid has tended to support 
misconceptions and flaws embodied in the underlying logic of the ‘Global War on 
Terror’. These are assessed in the third section. Certain aid actors have 
contributed to the establishment of new counter-terrorism structures, which are 
examined in section four. These have caused new pressures and threats for 
human rights, the treatment of Muslims and Somalis, and the spaces for civil 
society to organise. These are considered in light of the differential responses of 
civil society and the failure of mainstream groups and the media to interrogate the 
pretext of counter-terrorism in Kenya or the methods and strategies employed 
under the guise of security. 
 
This paper draws upon fieldwork in Kenya carried out on several trips between 
July 2006 and June 2007. The research is based on a review of primary and 
secondary sources including government and donor documentation and media 
reports as well as qualitative interviewing with aid and donor agency staff, 
government officials, democracy and governance NGOs, humanitarian 
organisations, human rights activists, Muslim community leaders and journalists. 
A total of 56 interviews were carried out in Nairobi and Mombasa. Further, a 
roundtable was organised in Nairobi with donor agency officials, civil society 
activists and NGO representatives to scrutinise important themes arising from the 
interviews and to assess the wider context of donor – civil society relations in 
Kenya. 
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II) Politics of aid, civil society and the state 
 
The security prerogative affecting bilateral relations and shifts in development 
strategies and objectives is one of many pressures and trends shaping relations 
between civil society and the state in Kenya. Discussions on counter-terrorism tie 
into various divisions and debates in Kenya on uneven development, inequality, 
and marginalisation of certain communities and areas of the country. A deeper 
understanding of the positions different communities are staking in relation to 
global politics and counter-terrorism measures and legislation thus requires 
examining the broader social and political context of state-civil society relations. 
 
The perception in the west of Kenya as a linchpin of stability in east and the Horn 
of Africa belies a history of armed conflict, social violence, subversive political 
struggle, and the abuse of powers by successive political leaders. Armed conflict 
and violence were constitutive of the modern Kenya nation-state, notably the 
pacification campaigns against pastoralist populations in the north of the country, 
the displacement and removal of Maasai peoples from high potential eco-zones, 
as well as insurgency by Mau Mau fighters against the colonial government 
throughout the state-declared emergency in the 1950s. Many state institutions 
that were created under colonial rule for advancing and consolidating the 
economic and political interests of the white settler and commercial farming 
classes remain in place. The provincial administration is a notable vestige of 
colonial governance and oppressive politico-administration that consists of a top-
down hierarchy of appointed provincial and district commissioners, as well as 
district officers, village chiefs and administrative police. The Kenya National Police 
is both feared and reviled by a general public that has grown accustomed to 
corruption and brutality in policing practices. Throughout Kenya’s post-
independence history, the police and security agencies have been routinely 
implicated in human rights abuses including arbitrary arrest and detention, torture, 
as well as extra-judicial killings. 
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State bureaucratic practices of control in turn are perceived to disadvantage 
certain marginalised communities, in particular pastoralists, the urban destitute 
and slum dwellers, and Muslims. Feelings of marginalisation run deeply in these 
communities and tie into a legacy of unequal distribution of state resources for 
development and the failure of the state to provision social welfare and security 
for these groups. High levels of social violence and chronic low intensity conflict in 
some parts of Kenya are thus unsurprising in this context of oppressive state 
machinery and unequal development. In response to substantial development 
challenges and widespread poverty, the post-independence governments led by 
Jomo Kenyatta and Daniel Arap Moi promoted a notion of self-help, known as 
harambee, as well as charitable activity through missionaries that had been 
instrumental in provisioning health, education and agricultural extension services 
throughout Kenya during colonialism. Welfare-oriented community-level 
organisations such as women’s and youth groups mushroomed under the state-
promoted ideal of harambee. However, these were distinctly apolitical and mainly 
existed to address the manifestations of poverty while providing a clear channel 
for political patronage by political elites. This helped to create a precedent in 
Kenya in which charity is understood as gift-giving, not about challenging power 
relations and structures.i Under Kenyatta, Kenya became a one party state and 
there was a distinct intolerance for political organising outside of the ruling party 
machinery. Thus, there was no sanctioned political space for deliberation on the 
significant inequalities, uneven development and social and culture differences 
that underpin a chronic pattern of conflict and violence. 
 
Kenyan civil society was shaped greatly by state building processes begun during 
colonialism and continuing in the period of industrialisation after independence in 
1963. These processes led to the formation of modern forms of civil society such 
as trade unions, NGOs and professional societies, setting the stage for external 
engagement with civil society. A more politically-conscious form of civil society 
rose to prominence in the advent of multi-party politics in the early 1990s and 
subsequently during the struggle to secure a genuine democratic space through 
electoral reforms, such as opposing queue voting, and comprehensive 
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constitutional reform.ii Faith groups, including the Catholic Church and Protestant 
denominations, were instrumental in leveraging a politicised civil society in the 
late 1980s and early 1990s. Civil society, led initially by churches, flourished 
under public goodwill and receipt of donor assistance throughout the period of 
democratic struggle. Kenya under the regime of former President Moi was 
regarded as a near pariah state. Several leading donors ceased to channel 
funding through government offices or state institutions, instead favouring to 
support liberal-minded non-governmental organisations and human rights groups 
to pressure the government to commit to political reforms. 
 
Moi regarded civil society with undisclosed contempt and, not inaccurately, as a 
way for donors to channel support to political opposition. In 1991, just before the 
introduction of multi-party politics, the government passed an NGO law. Before its 
inception, civil society lobbied the government to create an enabling legal and 
policy framework to coordinate the activities of the sector, which had expanded 
enormously since Kenya’s independence in 1963. However, the NGO Act sought 
to restrict civil society by establishing a government NGO Bureau and a quasi-
independent NGO Council stuffed with government appointees. Controversially, 
the law required re-registration of NGOs every five years, which NGOs viewed as 
a tactic of intimidation meant to limit their engagement in politics.iii The Act 
became a focus of NGO protest and in 1993 the government entered into 
dialogue with civil society over the content of an NGO policy framework. Although 
a policy was never agreed, NGOs were successful in pressuring the government 
to agree several changes be made to the legal framework that resulted in greater 
independence of the sector and self-regulation through an NGO Council whose 
leaders would be elected by NGO representatives themselves. 
 
A network of religious leaders, discrete activists and influential CSOs – many 
supported by aid agencies – was at the forefront of the democratisation struggle 
throughout the 1990s. The victory in the December 2002 election of the National 
Rainbow Coalition (NARC), a motley grouping of political parties and former 
adversaries that campaigned on a political reform platform, was regarded as a 
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triumph for civil society and its efforts to consolidate democratic space. The 
election of NARC under the new President Mwai Kibaki was tied to its promises 
on governance reforms and a new political dispensation to address corruption, 
predation and the incompetence of politico-administrative functionaries and 
routine abuses by the police. Several key positions in the new government were 
filled by veteran civil society activists and human rights campaigners, including 
the Minister for Justice and Constitutional Affairs as well as the chief of a new 
ethics division in the Office of the President, who had been head of the Kenya 
chapter of Transparency International. Indeed, civil society perceived the NARC 
government to be its own.iv The struggle of a liberal, politically active civil society 
had been about gaining access to decision-making and to influence government 
policy and bureaucratic practice. Civil society, blinded by its apparent 
triumphalism in helping to elect NARC, was slow to define its purpose in the 
changed political context. Its growth during the democratisation process was 
determined by the nature of the former Moi regime and insipid politics at the heart 
of government at the time.v The failure of civil society to adequately define and 
articulate its role and purpose in the post-Moi context is a qualifier of its apparent 
achievement in gaining access to government. 
 
Since the 2002 election, the ruling NARC coalition has divided over 
disagreements on proposed constitutional reforms. These centred on changing 
executive authority and dividing powers between the president and a new post of 
prime minister. The first draft of the constitution known as the Bomas Draft was 
prepared by a broad constitutional assembly but was subsequently amended by 
elements close to the President. The amended draft, known as the Wako Draft, 
was voted on in a plebiscite in November 2005, which was won by the ‘No’ camp 
that supported shifting power to an executive prime minister as proposed in the 
Bomas Draft. This led to a split in the government and the resignation or firing of 
ministers aligned with the ‘No’ camp, leaving the cabinet composed of close allies 
of the president.vi  
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Ongoing debates on constitutional reforms and, as described below, opposition to 
counter-terrorism measures and advocacy on human rights issues, have 
reinvigorated civil society to a degree. But civil society in Kenya has shown itself 
to be an arena of political divisions and social disharmony. Most of civil society 
was strongly aligned with the ‘No’ camp and invested significantly in civic 
education on its positions. Leadership of the government recognised 
representative body for NGOs, the NGO Council, supported the ‘Yes’ camp. This 
led to acrimony within civil society and contributed significantly to the 
management crisis that engulfed the NGO Council and the failure of civil society 
up to now to agree representation of the sector at higher political levels and 
forums of debate. Thus, for example, the government through the NGO Bureau 
has initiated discussions on establishing a policy framework for NGOs. The 
government has consulted discrete individuals in civil society but has been unable 
to seek a more broadly representative view from civil society in the absence of a 
functioning umbrella organisation. 
 
There have been significant changes in aid policy and practice toward civil society 
in Kenya since 2002. The election of NARC heralded a new trust and confidence 
in the capacities and commitments of the Kenyan state. This, in turn, dovetailed 
with shifts in donor aid approaches more widely to align with the development 
priorities and objectives of aid-recipient governments, as well as better coordinate 
and harmonise bilateral aid and, to this end, to channel greater support through 
government-owned programmes. Many bilateral agencies have increased their 
aid to the Kenyan government as well as shifted their support to sector-wide 
programmes as opposed to providing project-based funds to individual NGOs. 
This has meant, for example, that donors are funding fewer one-off projects, such 
as supporting an NGO to distribute anti-retroviral drugs (ARVs) at a particular 
clinic. In the new aid context in Kenya, for example, donors instead would channel 
greater support through a Ministry of Health initiative to distribute ARVs, which 
may include supporting an NGO to distribute drugs in line with the Ministry’s plans 
and targets. These changes are similar to donor approaches on governance in 
Afghanistan, where civil society is a mere afterthought in state-building strategies. 
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Governance is equated with government and the emphasis on checks and 
balances fades away once a government that speaks the good governance 
language of donors comes to power. 
 
These changes in aid approaches are acutely evident in the democracy and 
governance sector, where many leading bilaterals are supporting a large reform 
programme on the Governance, Justice, Law and Order Sector, or GJLOS. 
GJLOS is a Kenyan government programme but the procurement systems and 
finances are managed by the accounting giant KPMG. The programme envisages 
an ideal type of relationship between the state and civil society whereby non-state 
actors implement reforms under priority areas that have been identified by the 
state and agreed by contributing donors. GJLOS incorporates a fund for 
supporting civil society. The Kenyan government has resisted the inclusion of civil 
society in GJLOS although it has welcomed its contribution in other sectors such 
as health and education.vii Further, civil society actors have objected 
fundamentally to receiving support under a government-controlled programme 
and have come to openly question the government’s commitment to reforms. 
Many leading NGOs working on democracy, governance and human rights issues 
have experienced difficulties in accessing donor funds, which they explain is 
because donors have shifted their support away from civil society to the 
government. Leading donors including USAID and DfID maintain their funding for 
Kenyan government programmes is drawn from new support, which is reflected in 
an increase in overall aid they give to Kenya. Still, donors have tacitly recognised 
the difficulty many NGOs have encountered in accessing donors’ funds for work 
on democracy and governance and are moving to establish a funding facility for 
non-state actors outside of GJLOS.viii But here, too, divisions have emerged 
between civil society, which insists on greater representation in deciding the use 
of these funds, and donors who believe this could lead to partiality and 
disagreements.ix Ultimately, the tensions point to a lack of trust between civil 
society and donors that has arisen since the election of the NARC government. 
 
NGPA Working Paper No 21                                                                                                                      10
Aid, Civil Society and the State in Kenya since 9/11  – Jeremy Lind and Jude Howell 
Another highly significant factor affecting donor engagement with civil society is 
fluctuating levels of funding for bilateral agencies and the concomitant shrinking of 
aid bureaucracies. Reductions in staffing levels have forced several donor 
agencies in Kenya to shift their approaches to working with civil society. These 
changes have involved greater outsourcing of key administrative and oversight 
functions to the private sector and large INGOs. An official with SIDA explained, 
‘[i]n 2003 we found ourselves stuck with partnerships with thirty to thirty-five 
CSOs. It was impossible for us to handle that and to have dialogue with all of 
them. We didn’t want to be a bank and that is the role we found ourselves 
[serving].’x In practice this has meant that donor agencies are giving larger grants 
to fewer, larger organisations with the administrative capacity for large grant 
administration. These trends disadvantage smaller, particularly indigenous civil 
society organisations without such capacity. 
 
The changing aid context in Kenya has highlighted the fragility of liberal, 
predominantly urban-based NGOs that advocate on issues of democracy, 
governance and human rights. By attributing their current funding constraints to 
shifting aid approaches, NGOs in the democracy and governance sector shift 
attention from issues that are more fundamental to their longer-term existence 
and position in Kenyan civil society, such as their continued dependence on 
external aid and disconnectedness from a domestic constituency that could 
guarantee it an element of independence. The intertwining of aid and security in 
the post-9/11 context further complicates the situation of liberal civil society in 
Kenya. The greater emphasis on security in bilateral relations, and the 
expectation of leading donors that the Kenyan government will do its bidding on 
counter-terrorism in the region, implies that donors are less likely to prioritise and 
seek reassurance from Nairobi on internal governance and human rights 
concerns. Regardless of the strategic interests impinging on development politics, 
the leverage of donors to influence the Kenya government’s policy and practice 
toward civil society is diminishing as Kenya’s dependence on ODA decreases. In 
recent years, ODA has accounted for less than 10% of planned expenditure Of 
interest here is that this reduced dependency on foreign aid has enabled the 
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Kenyan government to strike a populist chord in stalling new counter-terrorism 
legislation that is widely perceived as an imposition of US priorities. 
 
Aid officials claim their commitment to transparency, accountability and human 
rights as reasons for continuing support to civil society. The new mission 
statement of the Democracy and Governance office of USAID emphasises 
governance and the balance of powers between branches of government as well 
as between government and civil society.xi However, these objectives are 
seemingly in contention with the US government’s support for controversial 
counter-terrorism legislation in Kenya that would shift the balance of powers to 
unaccountable authorities as well as security agencies with a history of human 
rights abuses, as described below. Behind the official proclamations of support for 
civil society, many donors support moves by the Kenyan government to extend its 
regulatory control over civil society through a proposed new NGO policy 
framework and by way of anti-money laundering legislation. Thus, donor 
pronouncements on governance reforms would appear at odds with the macro 
strategic considerations that determine aid flows in furtherance of the Global ‘War 
on Terror’. These signify a return to a Cold War era politics of aid that demotes 
human rights and democracy matters to the disadvantage of civil society groups 
organising around these interests.  
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III) Aid and security since 9/11 
 
A. The securitisation of aid to Kenya 
The attacks of 9/11, and the background of the US embassy bombings in Nairobi 
and Dar es Salaam, intensified the convergence of security strategies and goals 
with the objectives and activities of development assistance in Kenya. Security 
concerns have crept into the development objectives of many donor agencies in 
Kenya, reflecting an intensifying encapsulation of development into the security 
strategies of leading bilateral and multi-lateral lenders. As detailed before, the 
national security strategies of several leading donor countries now posit a role for 
development aid as part of ‘softer’ security and counter-terrorism strategies. 
Development agencies, in turn, have underlined the security function of aid as 
part of a suite of calibrated measures in response to the terrorist threat. There is 
anecdotal evidence that counter-terrorism and security priorities are determining 
shifts in the targeting of development assistance to different regions within Kenya 
as well as to new activities. Generally, indications are that there is a refocusing of 
US development aid to communities that are perceived as a security risk, 
including the Somali population inhabiting a large swath of eastern Kenya and the 
Swahili Muslims living along the coast, who have historical linkages with Yemen 
and Oman. One example of this security-determined targeting is a new USAID 
initiative on pastoralist livelihoods and peace-building in the ‘Mandera Triangle’, a 
development term to refer to the region inhabited by Somali pastoralists where 
Kenya, Ethiopia and Somalia intersect. At the same time it is promoting new 
involvement with Somali pastoralists, USAID is scaling back significantly its efforts 
on conflict reduction and peace-building in the ‘Karamoja Cluster’ covering the 
pastoralist-inhabited border region between Uganda, Kenya and Sudan. 
 
Another indication of these changes is the changing orientation of development 
activities since 2001 to address, explicitly, the presumed causes of terrorism and 
radicalisation. These are thought to include underdevelopment, poverty and high 
levels of youth unemployment. In Kenya, donor agencies have developed new 
programming, and created new funding pools, to support initiatives on 
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development-security linkages. Muslim groups vigorously opposed efforts by 
USAID to develop curriculum for madrassas under a new strategic objective on 
education that was added to the agency’s development portfolio in 2003. This was 
ostensibly to support the new government’s policy reform to provide universal free 
primary education.xii However, efforts on madrassas specifically were interpreted 
by many Kenyan Muslims as an attempt to influence teaching and support for US 
policies inside madrassas. More recently, USAID has been involved in teacher 
development of madrassa maalims (teachers) in Coast Province as part of an 
initiative on ‘Education for Marginalised Children in Kenya’.xiii 
 
The greater interest, generally, in supporting initiatives in Muslim communities 
shows how Muslims have come into the range of view of donor agencies. But this 
is according to a gaze that constructs Muslims as problematic. The example of 
USAID supporting reforms within madrassas indicates that greater support is 
being provided to organisations working in and on ‘suspect’ communities, such as 
Muslims and young men. A UK government official in Nairobi explained, “[i]f you 
look at the engagement of donors with Muslim civil society, it is greater now than 
it was before and this is because of 9/11. You don’t see us engaging to this extent 
with Hindu groups, or Buddhist groups, for instance. We wouldn’t engage with 
Muslim groups as we are doing if there wasn’t a problem of Islamic extremism.” 
The same official went on, “there are some in Muslim communities who have a 
self-interest in perpetuating the message that Muslims are marginalised as a 
community. If you compare to 2001, you’d find that our engagement, both 
specifically and generally, with Muslims has increased.”xiv 
 
The nature and objectives of this engagement, however, seems to be the issue 
for many leaders and activists within ‘suspect’ communities, who understandably 
question new attention and resources from western donors. Civil society activists 
in these communities, in general, expressed a lack of trust in the motives of donor 
agencies, which ties into both national politics in Kenya around state-civil society 
relations as well as global politics and the perception of a ‘War on Islam’. Leaders 
and activists within Muslim communities, in particular, indicated difficulty in 
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securing funding for activities that could be construed as challenging the counter-
terrorism efforts of leading donors, such as advocating for the human rights of 
terror suspects.  
 
Still, there are mixed and not entirely negative outcomes of donor efforts to 
engage with groups in Muslim communities. One initiative that has generated 
significant interest within the aid establishment in Nairobi is through Danish 
DANIDA, and involves experimental small grant support to several community 
organisations in Coast Province under the rubric of ‘Peace, Development and 
Security’, a euphemism in development-speak for assistance targeted to counter-
terrorism objectives. Groups receiving assistance under the DANIDA initiative 
have undertaken a variety of outreach and advocacy activities that address 
problems of social justice and conflict. One group brought together church leaders 
and Islamic clerics for dialogue on issues of local and national importance, such 
as the inclusion of kadhi courts for Muslim personal law into the draft constitution, 
an issue that broke interfaith unity over broader constitutional change. The same 
interfaith group also mediated between the provincial security apparatus in Kwale, 
south of Mombasa, and the Mlungunipa, a group of mostly armed youth who had 
retreated to forests along the Kenya –Tanzania border to protest their socio-
economic marginalisation. The clergy offered to speak with the youth after other 
efforts at mediation failed, and the government threatened the use of force.xv 
 
Other donor agencies have sought the involvement of civil society through 
initiatives that explicitly seek to create awareness and support around the creation 
of new counter-terrorism structures. UNDP and the Commonwealth Secretariat 
have both provided technical assistance to the Kenyan government to develop 
and implement counter-terrorism legislation. Internationally, UN efforts on 
counter-terrorism have been monitored by a Counter Terrorism Committee (CTC). 
The Danish chair of the CTC in 2005 took steps to enhance the technical 
assistance provided through the UN counter-terrorism programme and link it to 
expanded development assistance efforts.xvi These efforts in Kenya involve 
capacity-building through the UNDP. A component of support provided to UNDP 
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includes work with civil society. UNDP officials in Nairobi intend to work with 
Muslim civil society organisations to counter perceptions that counter-terrorism 
measures target Muslims as well as to promote support of the need for new 
counter-terrorism law.xvii The CTC proposes supporting civil society to address 
the presumed causes of terrorism and radicalism as an alternative to hard 
security measures such as airport and border security and the training of special 
counter-terrorist police branches, which has been a greater focus of counter-
terrorism assistance thus far. 
 
The role of civil society has come to be seen as important in recent counter-
terrorism strategy in Kenya in view of the lack of public support for counter-
terrorism measures, generally, as well as the perception that such measures 
target Muslim populations. The role envisioned for civil society is to lend the aura 
of popular legitimacy to security strategies and activities, as well as represent the 
views of ‘suspect’ communities in dialogues on governance, security and 
development. However, as referred to previously, there is not appreciation for the 
role of civil society in providing alternative views or in any way challenging the 
motive, need and method of counter-terrorism and security strategies. 
 
This is because of an overriding suspicion of civil society as a willing accomplice, 
unbeknownst abettor, ideological sympathiser, or intrusive human rights and civil 
liberties defender. The ‘War on Terror’ has occasioned a new regulatory fervour in 
aid bureaucracies. Counter-terrorism measures and legislation in donor countries 
have entailed stringent anti-money laundering rules that extend liability for terrorist 
atrocities beyond financial institutions to funding agencies, civil society 
organisations, and even universities. In practice, this has meant that grant-makers 
such as bilateral donors and foundations, as well as northern-based international 
NGOs that provide grants to southern CSOs and CBOs, have had to expand their 
vetting and monitoring of partner organisations to ensure they do not have any 
linkages to listed terrorist groups. For example, USAID requires its grantees to 
sign an ‘Anti-Terrorism Certificate’ (ATC). Other funding bodies such as the Ford 
and Rockefeller Foundations have inserted new language in their standard grant 
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agreement letters that reflect such downward pressures on grant-making 
agencies to prevent the misuse of funds. However, at least some American aid 
officials in Nairobi imply that the ATC is a bureaucratic necessity but has little 
practical impact. One official commented, “if we have any doubts about an NGO 
in the sense they may support terrorism or violence, we would not support them 
anyway. The ‘Global War on Terror’ has not changed this.”xviii 
 
However, there is counter-evidence that a fear factor is causing some donors to 
exercise greater caution in their dealings with partners, and in the sorts of 
organisations and groups they will consider for funding. One civil society veteran 
observed, “donors have become more conservative. In a world where we don’t 
know who is who, we’ll be more conservative and cautious. There is concern 
[among donors] of inadvertently supporting terrorism.”xix Unsurprisingly, the chill 
factor has been greater for Middle Eastern philanthropies and international NGOs. 
Many have scaled back their giving and some have ceased their operations 
altogether, with alleged knock-on effects on the communities where they formerly 
implemented development projects. A Gulf philanthropic group, for instance, was 
hesitant to fund a new Islamic university in Coast Province without US embassy 
assurance that this would not be seen as support for ‘Islamic radicalism’ 
(Harmony Project, 2007: footnote 89). However, at the same time, the climate of 
fear and suspicion surrounding Islamic charitable networks has not prevented 
new organising and the creation of new civil society organisations within Muslim 
communities as well as the entry of new Islamic foundations into the philanthropic 
arena in Kenya. 
 
The securitisation of aid in Kenya has also included the new involvement of 
military and security actors in assistance activities. Since 2002 personnel from the 
Combined Joint Task Force Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA), a US counter-terrorism 
base in Djibouti reporting to US Central Command, have carried out ‘hearts and 
minds’ activities in communities in Coast and North Eastern Provinces such as 
building schools and operating mobile veterinary clinics. The CJTF is developing 
liaison positions and coordination mechanisms with civilian agencies and 
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departments such as USAID to institutionalise its efforts on development, which 
depend on input from American diplomatic corps in each of the countries where 
CJTF operates. Thus far assistance by the military has been carried out 
independently on the whole of activities by international NGOs, which have a long 
presence in the region. Indeed, there are no regularised contacts or coordination 
meetings between the CJTF and NGOs even though within CJTF there is an 
NGO liaison position. CJTF personnel do consult with community groups and 
leaders for the purposes of implementing projects and ulterior intelligence 
gathering. There is varying and contradictory evidence on public responses to 
military involvement in development in these communities. Infamously, the US 
ambassador and CJTF personnel were stoned when they visited Garissa town in 
North Eastern Province to promote the military’s efforts. Islamic clerics and elders 
in North Eastern Province have also addressed a letter to US officials 
condemning the military’s activities. However, there is anecdotal evidence that 
villagers in communities in and around Lamu in Coast Province welcomed the 
assistance of the US military.xx 
 
B. The politics of aid and security 
Generally, counter-terrorism has risen to the fore of conditionality requirements on 
aid recipient countries. After 9/11, the Cotonou Agreement between the EU and 
Africa, Caribbean and Pacific states was amended to require cooperation on 
counter-terrorism as part of the conditionality for receiving EU development aid. In 
Kenya, security conditionality on development aid has been most pronounced in 
its US bilateral relations. This pressure dates back to the 1998 embassy bombing 
since which time the US, as well as the UK and Israel, have criticised Kenya for 
inadequately pursuing and convicting terrorism suspects, which they attribute to 
weaknesses in policing and existing penal codes. The September 11th attacks 
ratcheted pressure on the Kenyan government to pass anti-terrorism legislation, 
as will be seen. The counter-terrorism agenda has defined Kenya – US bilateral 
relations to the extent that the US has in one instance abandoned a competing 
key diplomatic priority. As a condition for aid, the US attempted to strong arm the 
Kenyan government into signing a Bilateral Immunity Agreement (BIA) that would 
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grant US nationals immunity before the International Criminal Court (ICC), of 
which Kenya is a member. The Nethercutt Provision in the Foreign Operations 
Appropriations Bill ties US foreign assistance to countries’ support of the ICC by 
pushing countries to sign the BIA. These agreements require ICC member 
countries to exempt all US nationals and non-national contractors from 
accountability before the ICC for war crimes, crimes against humanity and 
genocide. Kenya lost an estimated $8 million in military financing and training aid 
after refusing to sign the BIA. However, this uncovered a conflict between the BIA 
requirement and Washington’s counter-terrorism priorities in Kenya. The US 
eventually reversed its position in the summer of 2006 to permit the resumption of 
security and military training aid to the Kenyan government. 
 
Further, there is a popular perception in Kenya, supported by many senior 
politicians and government officials, that the US and UK governments have 
sought to harm Kenya’s tourism industry by issuing travel advisories as a punitive 
measure against the Kenyan government for failing to pass stronger counter-
terrorism legislation. The issue topped Nairobi’s agenda during Kibaki’s state visit 
to Washington in November 2003 and, despite repeated diplomatic overtures by 
the Kenyan government since, the US and UK have refused to rescind the travel 
advisories.  
 
In other ways, the Kenyan government has used its diminishing dependence on 
aid from traditional western donors to leverage its own interests in discussions on 
security and counter-terrorism. New security assistance to Kenya has derived 
from assessments of the probable threat of terrorism (Harmony Project, 2007). 
The Kenyan government has played on the perception of a significant terrorist 
threat in the Horn of Africa for diplomatic advantages. Internally, it has reacted to 
populist sentiment against counter-terrorism measures and legislation backed by 
Anglo-American pressure. Senior politicians have criticised US counter-terrorism 
policies in the region and have pressured the Kibaki administration to wager its 
cooperation on the receipt of various security hardware.xxi Similarly, the 
perception that there is American largesse to be tapped for organising around 
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security affects civil society outlooks on aid. An NGO head and leader in Muslim 
communities observed, “[f]ighting terror is big business. Probably I could get 
money as an NGO if I said I was going to fight terrorism. If I want to do this, I can 
go to the Americans tomorrow and get money for training in counter-terrorism and 
equipment. Counter-terrorism is used as an excuse for agencies and 
organisations to procure. Every government department wants to cash in on this 
to get training and equipment.”xxii 
 
These challenges reveal that Kenya’s incentives in counter-terrorism are not fully 
aligned with those of donors since Nairobi can benefit materially from its 
cooperation, which is based on the perception of threat. It has been suggested as 
a way of overcoming this dilemma that donors reorient their assistance to areas 
where there are fewer opportunities for patronage, such as increased police and 
governance training as well as anti-corruption efforts (Harmony Project, 2007: 71). 
Elsewhere in Africa, it is observed that the US pursues a politics of destablisation 
by playing on an exaggerated assessment of the terrorism threat to supply 
security assistance and military training aid to friendly regimes (Keenan, 2006). In 
turn, these regimes instigate conflict and acts of violence to create the 
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IV) Counter-terrorism, the politics of fear and civil society 
responses 
 
A. Counter-terrorism structures in Kenya: 
Against this backdrop of diplomatic pressure and new security parameters on aid, 
the Kenyan government has instituted a range of new counter-terrorism 
structures. These structures encompass a suite of measures to enhance 
intelligence gathering as well as policing and surveillance of suspect communities. 
Unsurprisingly, foreign security assistance and training aid were pivotal to the 
establishment of post-9/11 counter-terrorism structures in Kenya, many of which 
involve new and greater levels of cooperation with foreign security and 
intelligence agencies, some by way of extra-judicial practices and institutions. 
Kenya was one of only five states to receive special training through the US 
government’s Anti-Terrorism Assistance Program in the 2005 budget. Kenya was 
supported through the program to establish a National Security Intelligence 
Services (NSIS) (Harmony Project, 2007). Other measures include the 
establishment of a Joint Terrorism Task Force in 2003 and the National Security 
Advisory Committee in 2004 (ibid.: 57). In 2004 the US government funded the 
establishment in Nairobi of a National Counter-Terrorism Centre that, notionally, 
sits within the NSIS but is rumoured to be under the direct operational guidance of 
Washington.xxiii 
 
Previously, police swoops on Muslim communities in the aftermath of the hotel 
bombing in Kikambala in November 2002 generated scrutiny and public debate 
on the involvement of foreign security agencies in the surveillance, arrest and 
interrogation of terror suspects. Human rights groups and the Kenyan media have 
reported numerous instances in which foreign security services interrogated terror 
suspects, in some cases involving the use of force as well as torture during 
interrogations (Amnesty International, 2005; authors’ interviews). Alleged 
infringements of human rights of terror suspects was again highlighted by the 
capture of terrorism suspects in Kenya following the flight of civilians and fighters 
from southern Somalia into Kenya in early 2007 after military action led by the 
NGPA Working Paper No 21                                                                                                                      21
Aid, Civil Society and the State in Kenya since 9/11  – Jeremy Lind and Jude Howell 
Ethiopian government against the Islamic Courts Union, which briefly governed 
southern Somalia in 2006. The US acknowledged that investigators of the Federal 
Bureau of Investigations (FBI) interrogated terrorism suspects in Kenya, some 
whom were sent to Somalia and then transferred secretly to prisons in Ethiopia 
where they were again questioned by American intelligence agents.xxiv One 
suspect was extradited to Guantanamo Bay.xxv The circumstances of arrest and 
detention of terror suspects in these cases have shown that Kenyan authorities 
failed in certain instances to comply with international human rights law and 
standards as well as Kenyan law. 
 
The central involvement in these raids of the Anti-Terror Police Unit (ATPU), 
established in the aftermath of the embassy bombing in 1998 within the national 
police force, has added to concerns for human rights and the treatment of Muslim 
communities, who feel targeted by anti-terrorist operations. More robust policing 
has been matched by closer scrutiny of individuals applying for identification 
papers and travel documents. These efforts, and other post-9/11 counter-
terrorism measures, tie into broader political and deeper historical contexts 
concerning the identity, citizenship and political rights of Muslim communities 
along the coast and in North Eastern Province. As explained below, activists and 
groups organising around the interests of Kenya’s Muslims allege that it is more 
difficult for Muslims to obtain identity cards that are required for employment, as 
well as passports to be able to take up overseas education and employment 
opportunities. 
 
Kenya’s counter-terrorism structures have been introduced in a legal vacuum. 
Human rights groups maintain there is no legal basis for some measures, such as 
the creation of the ATPU. Since 2002, diplomatic missions in Nairobi representing 
leading western donors have pressured the Kenyan government to adopt 
controversial new counter-terrorism legislation. Efforts by the Kenyan government 
to pass a Suppression of Terrorism Bill (SOT) in 2003 failed, as described below. 
The government has also drafted anti-money laundering legislation, which is a 
response to UN resolution 1373 (2001) that requests governments to undertake 
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measures to limit the use of businesses, remittances and charities to finance 
terrorism.xxvi NGOs have been a specific focus of money laundering suspicions in 
Kenya. In general, the Kenyan government has increased checks on NGOs as 
part of its counter-terrorism efforts. The closer inspection of NGOs goes back to 
the aftermath of the 1998 bombing of the US embassy, when several Muslim 
organisations that provided relief and welfare services to refugee communities in 
North Eastern Province were proscribed on suspicion of supporting terrorist 
activities. The longer-term impact of the clampdown was to cast suspicion over 
the Islamic charitable network consisting of small CSOs and madrassas as well 
as local offices of Middle Eastern charities. 
 
Security concerns have also crept into discussions around a proposed new 
regulatory framework for NGOs as signaled in the Sessional Paper Number One 
of 2006 agreed by cabinet, with various political leaders associating the activities 
of some organisations with terrorism. Although the political rationale for the new 
framework is to fight corruption in NGOs, which are perceived to be misused for 
personal enrichment rather than undertaking activities for public benefit, some 
government officials have made statements expressing concern over prospective 
linkages between NGOs, terrorism and money laundering. This suspicion of 
NGOs as conduits for terrorist financing and money laundering is a recurring 
aspect of global political discourses on terrorism. Opposition in Malawi and 
Zambia have been labelled as terrorists. Rebels in Congo and Rwanda have been 
branded terrorists as well and beyond negotiation (BBC News online, 02-01-07). 
In Uganda, the government passed new legislation in 2006 that requires NGOs to 
re-register on an annual basis. The law also created representation for security 
agencies on the government’s NGO registration board but not for NGOs 
themselves. 
 
The principal measure in Kenya’s post-9/11 counter-terrorism structures is the 
SOT Bill, which the Attorney General published in 2003. The government 
withdrew the bill following intense public opposition by the media, human rights 
organisations, Muslim groups, and, crucially, members of the Parliamentary 
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Committee on Justice and Constitutional Affairs charged with reviewing the bill 
before it was debated. The government initiated fresh discussions on the bill in 
2005 and a new Anti-Terrorism Bill was circulated to government departments in 
2006. A coalition of human rights activists and organisations through the Kenya 
Human Rights Network (K-HURINET) organised a concerted campaign against 
the bill, as described in the following section. They objected to the definition of 
‘terrorism’ in the bill, which was felt to be vague and open to a number of 
interpretations. Another concern was that the bill lowered fair trial standards by 
requiring the prosecution in terror cases to show ‘reasonable suspicion’ based on 
the ‘balance of probabilities’ rather than prove their case beyond reasonable 
doubt, thus shifting the burden of proof to suspects. Objections were also raised 
that the bill targeted Muslim communities. In this regard, a clause of considerable 
concern created an offence for people dressed in a way “as to arouse reasonable 
suspicion that he is a member of a declared terrorist organisation” (RoK, 2003). 
The bill also granted the minister responsible for national security the powers to 
make exclusion orders but only against individuals with dual citizenship. This was 
perceived as directly targeting Muslims, many who descend from immigrants from 
Somalia, the Arabian Peninsula and south Asia. In response to the bill, the Kenya 
National Commission on Human Rights, the governmental human rights 
watchdog, stated “[l]aws or policies must not target or appear selective by 
community or group” (KNCHR, 2003: 8). 
 
B. Organising around counter-terrorism structures 
Kenya’s counter-terrorism structures have been instituted contrary to widespread 
opposition among domestic political constituencies. Human rights networks, legal 
groups and Muslim organisations have been galvanised to organise against 
proposed anti-terrorism legislation through the formation of new ad hoc networks 
and groups such as the Muslim Human Rights Forum and the Coast Anti-Terror 
Network. A sub-committee of K-HURINET has organised civil society opposition 
to the SOT Bill. They have argued that fundamental human rights must be 
protected, mechanisms to fight terrorism must safeguard human rights and that 
counter-terrorism should be a partnership between the state and society and not 
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one against the other. Among the controversial provisions in early versions of the 
SOT Bill, it would grant wide discretionary powers to authorities such as searches 
without warrant and to detain terror suspects without charge. 
 
The thinking of groups opposed to the SOT Bill was informed by a background of 
struggle against human rights infringements and the abuse of powers by political 
functionaries and state security personnel. Throughout the struggle in the 1990s 
for democratic politics and the promotion of human rights, Kenyan civil society 
had opened additional space to organise outside of the state. The spaces for non-
governmental public action came under scrutiny in the SOT Bill. Section 9 of the 
bill conferred the minister responsible for national security powers to proscribe 
any organisation they suspect of supporting terrorism but without establishing the 
norms to be used in determining suspicion. This matter was complicated by the 
broad and unclear definition of ‘terrorism’ in the bill. There is no consensus 
definition of terrorism even within multi-lateral institutions such as the UN. This 
complicates law-making on counter-terrorism since there is no internationally 
agreed legal definition. Northern governments, in passing their own anti-terrorism 
legislation, have tended to define the terrorist threat as qualitatively new and 
different, requiring extraordinary legislation.xxvii Kenyan scholar Professor Ali 
Mazrui noted that the “bill is so wide-ranging that the police or the minister can 
decide which kind of public demonstration constituted support for terrorist forces 
abroad” (2003: 5). The bill did not propose any appeal mechanism or independent 
adjudication authority in cases where an organisation wants to contest the 
minister’s declaration. New offences were also proposed for persons who are 
members, supporters, or fundraisers for organisations declared to support 
terrorism. However, as elsewhere in the bill, the use of indistinct language and 
inadequate definition of terms cast a shadow over individuals and groups who 
would have desired to assist a declared terrorist organisation in view of the fact 
that they risked being charged for ‘supporting’ terrorism. An official from a human 
rights NGO referred to the risks in a statement to the Kenyan media, “[t]his is a 
threat to civil society and activists. They can choose to declare the KHRC (Kenya 
Human Rights Commission, an NGO) a terrorist group for speaking out and 
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demonstrating against detention. It even puts you [the journalist] at risk for the 
simple reason that you are writing about and against the anti-terrorism bill, making 
you a target and possible terrorist suspect.”xxviii 
 
A contributing factor to civil society opposition to the SOT Bill was the sentiment 
that Kenyans were being made to pay the price through more strident anti-
terrorism measures for a terrorist threat that was not theirs. One civil society 
activist explained it this way, “the perception of most Kenyans is that the Kenyan 
victims of [terrorist] attacks are collateral damage and not targets themselves… 
Kenyans view themselves as caught up in the crossfire and [believe] that the 
conflict is not ours. It is western targets that have brought terror to Kenya.”xxix The 
popular view of Kenyans is that terrorism is not a domestic policy priority, or at 
least should not be, and that counter-terrorism is a western agenda that is being 
unfairly imposed on the country.xxx Civil society critiques of the bill also 
emphasised the importance of other issues that cause insecurity for the majority 
of Kenyans, such as economic disparities and access to resources. In 
comparison, terrorism was perceived as unimportant.xxxi 
 
Although new restrictions on the spaces to organise outside of the state were an 
integral part of the SOT Bill, mainstream civil society was largely silent in its 
response. As referred to previously, human rights groups and organisations 
representing Muslim communities who were directly affected by the proposed law 
were the exceptions in civil society who organised against the bill. Church clergy 
have been silent on the treatment of Muslims in counter-terrorism operations even 
though they worked with Muslim religious scholars and leaders on constitutional 
reform issues in the lead up to a 2005 plebiscite, at which point disagreements 
emerged around the inclusion of Kadhis courts in the draft constitution for 
safeguarding Muslim personal law. The disagreement led to Muslim clerics 
withdrawing from the inter-faith Ufungamano Initiative that had lobbied for 
constitutional reform.xxxii The media, as well, has tended to cover human rights 
violations of terror suspects from a security perspective without interrogating 
government actions in the name of security.xxxiii Public opinion in Kenya is that 
NGPA Working Paper No 21                                                                                                                      26
Aid, Civil Society and the State in Kenya since 9/11  – Jeremy Lind and Jude Howell 
counter-terrorism measures affect Muslims. Mainstream civil society is also 
blinkered in its view of what constitutes ‘civil society’, one that does not include 
Muslim organisations and civic groups, and thus does not seek common cause 
with organisations for whom counter-terrorism is a major concern. The leader of 
one Muslim organisation explained the divisions within civil society around 
responding to the pressures caused by counter-terrorism, 
 
Civil society is split into three groups. One group, out of fear, has 
stayed out of the question (of counter-terrorism) altogether. They 
fear being implicated by association and fear that their funding from 
western governments will be withdrawn. This is mostly Kenyan 
NGOs. But international NGOs have also not raised their voice on 
terrorism in Kenya, at least not locally. I can be clean as snow but if I 
am arrested on suspicion of terrorism, then everyone in the NGO 
community abandons me. There is a whole environment of fear. A 
second group take this as a fait accompli, that this is part of 
American power. The US is the strongest power and you cannot do 
anything, is their view. They will talk with us [Muslim organisations] 
and identify right and wrong in the Global ‘War on Terror’, and even 
sympathise with us, but they are resigned. Then there is a third 
group, consisting of a handful of organisations, that is challenging 
this directly…Almost all non-Muslim NGOs are in the first and 
second group. They are silent and not opening up much to us and 
we don’t know why.xxxiv 
 
A further contributing factor to the lack of response by civil society is that since the 
NGO Council is moribund there is not a broader unified civil society voice on 
these issues. Human rights organisations and Muslim groups have tried to work 
around these constraints by coming together in ad-hoc coalitions and networks to 
oppose particular measures and laws but this does not make up the need for an 
umbrella body to give leverage to the advocacy issues and actions of a smaller 
number of organisations and groups. 
 
The production of suspicion and fear around the Muslim charitable network has 
undoubtedly influenced the reticence observed in civil society as a whole. 
Pressures and threats for civil society generated by new counter-terrorism 
structures have disproportionately impacted Muslim organisations and groups 
where a ‘siege mentality’ has begun to take hold. As mentioned above, these 
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pressures date back to the aftermath of the US embassy bomb blast in 1998 
when several Muslim NGOs were forced to suspend their operations, staff were 
detained and interrogated by security agencies, and the foreign heads of some 
organisations were deported. Some organisations were allowed to re-register but 
they faced constant monitoring and obstruction by the police and provincial 
administration in the areas in which they operated.xxxv In the time since, five 
Muslim NGOs have been proscribed often at the behest of foreign governments. 
The Saudi Al Haramain Foundation was proscribed in 2003 and has been subject 
to investigations in the US. The Crescent of Hope which did relief work in northern 
Kenya was forced to close. Some organisations have voluntarily closed down 
under immense government pressure, such as the Al Ibrahim Foundation. Other 
organisations such as the Africa Muslim Agency, Young Muslims Association and 
Northern Aid continue to operate but under stringent conditions and in spite of 
administrative interference by provincial authorities.xxxvi Many civic leaders in 
Muslim communities contend that the crackdown on larger welfare-oriented 
Muslim NGOs has caused a ripple effect impacting community based 
organisations who partnered with the larger NGOs in running orphanages, 
schools and health centres, particularly in North Eastern Province.xxxvii Part of the 
difficulty civil society has encountered in drawing attention to these impacts has 
been the paucity of documentation by NGOs and community leaders to detail the 
precise effects, for example in terms of numbers of children denied schooling or 
orphans being turned away. 
 
A clampdown on Muslim NGOs has been matched by greater restrictions on the 
flow of funds originating from states in the Gulf and Middle East. Donorship from 
this region was relatively important for Muslim organisations working in North 
Eastern Province where again the impacts have been felt disproportionately 
although specific and precise evidence to quantify these claims is lacking, as well. 
 
In other ways, the spaces for Muslims to organise have been constrained by 
various counter-terrorism measures and practices. Madrassas and mosques have 
been constructed as sites for radicalisation and extremism and have come under 
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greater scrutiny. Consultants for the Ministry of Education suggested assessing 
the content of madrassa curriculum.xxxviii Other recent proposals have sought 
greater regulatory oversight of mosques through central registration and 
monitoring charity flows through mosque networks. Currently, there is no central 
registration or regulatory authority for mosques or madrassas. These proposals 
have not been pursued but they have had the effect of intimidating local people 
who would otherwise give donations to madrassas or mosque committees.xxxix 
 
There have been different responses within Muslim communities to these various 
pressures and threats. In regard to monitoring mosques, some Muslims proposed 
that mosques register with the government and keep a list of their members, 
which would then be made available to the state as is done in Turkey. Others 
within the community strongly resisted any attempts at government oversight.xl 
Some Muslim leaders and groups have vocally opposed counter-terrorism 
measures, laws and practices, as seen in their efforts to organise against the SOT 
Bill. A Muslim organisation has also sought to document the culpability of the 
Kenyan government in the rendition of 152 terror suspects to Somalia, including 
twenty Kenyan citizens (Muslim Human Rights Forum, 2007). Groups such as the 
Council of Imams and Preachers of Kenya and the National Muslim Leaders 
Forum have spoken out in the media against raids by the Anti-Terrorism Police 
Unit on Muslim neighbourhoods and have met with politicians and government 
officials to voice their concerns. In other ways, Muslims are adapting to rather 
than resisting increased pressures but this typically involves restricting their own 
efforts and rights to organise. Many groups are not seeking to formally register 
because they are resigned to the possibility of being denied registration.xli This 
self-censorship is also seen in organisations avoiding the use of Arabic names or 
the word ‘Muslim’. Some groups have sought legal shelter by becoming a 
programme of a registered organisation, a tactic used in the 1990s by human 
rights organisations who encountered difficulties registering during the Moi 
regime. 
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Part of the difficulty for civil society organisations that want to work on these 
issues is the lack of donor support as well as the acute bureaucratic pressure on 
organisations that speak out against government counter-terrorism policies and 
practices. Human rights organisations have complained that the government uses 
the Kenya Revenue Authority to intimidate groups that speak out.xlii But 
democracy and governance civil society organisations can no longer rely on 
donors to pressure the government both because donor priorities themselves 
have shifted as well as the fact that the government’s aid dependency has 
decreased meaning the leverage of donors to influence the behaviours of the 
Kenyan government has diminished, as detailed earlier. According to some civil 
society actors, mainstream NGOs risk losing donor support if they are seen to be 
helping Muslim organisations and human rights groups organising on these 
issues.xliii Muslim organisations and human rights groups that have organised on 
issues of counter-terrorism have done so in spite of a lack of funding and 
administrative harassment and bureaucratic obstruction in gaining access to 
sensitive information on terrorism suspects and police raids. However, the 
effective efforts of the few organisations and groups that have taken up these 
challenges in documenting and exposing government practices as well as 
opposing the SOT Bill shows there is scope for civil society to organise more 
determinedly and coherently around new and emerging counter-terrorism 
measures, laws and policing practices. 
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V) Conclusion 
 
The increasing encapsulation of Kenya into the military and political prosecution 
of the ‘Global War on Terror’ has coincided with processes of democratisation and 
the opening of political space. Observers have noted that in some cases fighting 
terrorism goes hand in hand with spreading democracy, as proposed laws have 
generated widespread debate in some new democracies such as South Africa 
and the Philippines (Whitaker, 2007). Proposed anti-terrorism legislation has been 
galvanising in Kenya but for no more than a minority segment of civil society 
consisting of urban-based lawyers, human rights organisations and networks, and 
groups representing Muslims who are disproportionately affected by new counter-
terrorism measures and practices. Opposition to specific anti-terrorism measures, 
laws and practices in Kenya has occurred in spite of a lack of institutional support 
and funding, intimidation by governmental regulatory bodies and the associated 
risk of de-registration and blacklisting for groups organising on these issues, as 
well as the possibility of losing donor funding for other activities on the basis of 
being perceived as sympathising with terrorists. 
 
The challenges for civil society in Kenya consist of persisting international 
pressure on the Kenyan government for its cooperation on the ‘War on Terror’, 
the subtle introduction of counter-terrorism measures outside of a supportive legal 
framework, and internal divisions within civil society that preclude a more 
coherent advocacy strategy and plan. The role of development aid has been 
problematic by reifying certain misconceptions that Kenyan Muslims are 
radicalised and sympathise with foreign terrorists. Despite this, there have been 
some positive impacts of some security-oriented development assistance to 
grassroots groups working on issues of human rights, conflict management and 
community development. Unfortunately, the securitisation of development has on 
the whole too often prompted a shift away from human security approaches to 
complex political situations. The efforts of some aid donors to promote capacity 
building of counter-terrorism institutions or encourage public awareness of the 
presumed need for new counter-terrorism structures are alienating to the section 
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of civil society that are trying to domesticate the debate and are taking ownership 
of the issues in the Kenyan political context by conducting their own research, 
documentation and advocacy. The use of more overt political criteria in targeting 
some types of aid in Kenya has also minimised the potentially ameliorative 
impacts of development. Or, as the head of a Muslim NGO put it, “the US can put 
up fifty schools in North Eastern Province but this does not change local 
perceptions.”xliv 
 
Although the space for political debate and discourse is large and expanding, this 
has brought about the fragmentation of civil society into disparate groups 
coalescing around discrete economic, ethnic and regional interests. The effects of 
fragmentation are magnified by the disintegration of the NGO Council as the 
representative body of NGOs at higher levels of political debate and policy-
making. The failures of NGO representation at a national level have impeded 
greater levels of connectivity among different interest groups, which could 
leverage the interests and concerns of smaller groupings and thus inject civil 
society more forcefully into discussions around the ‘War on Terror’ in Kenya and 
the region. The formation of ad-hoc coalitions and networks to advocate against 
specific counter-terrorism practices, measures and proposed laws is an 
adaptation to the post-2002 political landscape in which civil society engaged in 
democracy, governance and human rights issues is under growing pressure to 
better define and more forcefully assert its role and purpose. This is especially 
urgent in view of aid trends toward supporting government programmes and 
priority areas, which has entailed a de-emphasis on civil society support as a 
component of better governance. The strong protestations of democracy and 
governance civil society in the face of these changes ultimately points to its aid 
dependence and the want for private donorship in Kenya in support of human 
rights.  
 
In many ways, these difficulties speak to the divisions seen in wider society and 
the lack of political consciousness among mainstream civil society. Many counter-
terrorism issues such as police raids and the treatment of terrorism suspects are 
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perceived to involve Muslims, which again ties into larger political discourses 
beyond Kenya that construct Muslim communities as suspicious. Thus, in 
mainstream public debate the significance is lost of new counter-terrorism 
structures for the fundamental human rights of all, as well as for the actors and 
spaces of civil society. Many young Muslims in Kenya, in turn, feel targeted by 
counter-terrorism operations and believe their interests are sacrificed in 
discussions on ‘security’ that predominate policy in the Global ‘War on Terror’. 
However, all of this points to the continuing need for civil society to make its 
contribution to policy discussions and public debates on the ‘War on Terror’. The 
effective efforts of the few organisations and groups that have taken up these 
challenges in documenting and exposing government practices shows there is 
scope for civil society to organise more determinedly and coherently around new 
and emerging counter-terrorism measures, laws and security practices.  
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